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BASIS OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to the Utah Const, art. VIII, S 3, and Utah Code Ann.
S 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellee, H. Glenn Olson, disagrees with the Appellants'
statement of the issues presented for review in the following
respects.

The matters presented as issue nos. 1 and 2 (discussed

in Appellants' Brief at Points I and II) were not raised in the
district court; therefore, the issues may not be considered by
this Court on appeal.

See Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire &

Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987), and Argument at Point I.
Hence, the only issues properly presented in this appeal are:
1.

Did the trial court err in dismissing Park's counter-

claim on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted?
In reviewing the trial court's order, the Court considers
the material allegations of the counterclaim as true, and will
affirm a dismissal for failure to state a claim only if it
appears that the claimant can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim.

Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 132 Utah Adv. Rpt. 3

(Utah 1990) .
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2.

Did the trial court err in awarding Olson his attor-

neys* fees incurred in connection with the claims for indemnity
against Park-Craig-Olson, Inc. ("PCO")?
As the issue presented does not involve the amount of
attorneys' fees awarded, but merely the propriety of any award of
attorneys' fees, the issue is a question of law which the court
reviews for correctness.

See Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah

1989) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Olson believes Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415 (1953, as
amended), is determinative of the attorneys' fee issue.

Utah

Code Ann. § 70A-3-415 states, in pertinent part:
(1) An accommodation party is one who signs the
instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending
his name to another party to it.
•

*

•

(5) An accommodation party is not liable to the party
accommodated, and if he pays the instrument has a right
of recourse on the instrument against such party.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Disposition Below.

Olson filed his complaint seeking indemnity from PCO and
contribution from J. Samuel Park ("Park") and Ellis Edward Craig
("Craig") for amounts Olson paid to First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A. (the "Bank"), on a judgment rendered in favor of the Bank on
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certain notes.

The notes were executed by PCO.

Olson, Park and

Craig had each executed a guaranty to the Bank of PCO's debts.
During the course of proceedings below, summary judgment was
granted in favor of Olson against Craig for the amount demanded.
R. 528-30.

Craig has taken no appeal from the judgment.

Shortly after PCO and Park filed their answer, Olson filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment against PCO and Park.

R. 92-94.

The

Motion for Summary Judgment was denied without prejudice to its
renewal, and, in the same order, the trial court granted leave to
PCO and Park to file counterclaims and established a deadline for
completing discovery with respect to alleged setoff claims that
could be asserted by PCO and Park against Olson.

R. 388-91.

Thereafter, and within the time allowed by the court, Park
(but not PCO) filed a counterclaim.

R. 397-414.

Shortly after

filing of the counterclaim, Olson renewed his motion for summary
judgment against Park and PCO, and filed a motion to dismiss the
counterclaim of Park for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.

R. 417-19, 432-33.

The district court

granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss Park's counterclaim and the
renewed motion for summary judgment.

R. 592-94, 615-18.

Prior

to entry of the Summary Judgment, PCO and Park objected to the
proposed award of attorneys' fees as against PCO, which objection
was overruled by the Court.

R. 612-14.

their notice of appeal.
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Park and PCO then filed

B.

Statement of Facts.

Although Olson generally agrees with the statement of facts
set forth by Park and PCO, several items require clarification.
When Park paid $235,000 to the Bank, he obtained a release of
Park, PCO and Craig from any liability on any obligations to the
Bank, including the notes upon which the Bank had obtained a
judgment against Olson (although the Bank's claims against Olson
were reserved).

R. 249 (Aff. of Park, H 13). Park's payments to

the Bank were later fully reimbursed by PCO in connection with the
sale of PCO's assets to Marie Callender Ventures, Inc., in June of
1988.

R. 405-06, 414.

Thus, when Olson's Complaint was filed in

February of 1989, Park had not paid any money to the Bank on
account of his guaranty that had not been reimbursed by PCO, the
principal obligor.

R. 249-50 (Aff. of Park, f 14).

Further,

except to the extent Olson is entitled to enforce the Bank's notes
under principles of subrogation, the Bank was not owed any money
when plaintiff's complaint was filed, having released its claims
as against Park, Craig, and PCO, and having satisfied the judgment
as against Olson. R. 133-34 248-49, 257-70.
Park's counterclaim asserts an entitlement to recover 16.67%
(being Olson's proportionate ownership of PCO) of the following
sums:
(1)

$4,374.73 in general advances by Park to PCO that
had not been reimbursed;

(2)

$2,981.50 in accounting fees paid to David Pelton;
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(3)

$33,050.89 in attorneys1 fees paid to Suitter
Axland Armstrong & Hanson;

(4)

$320.25 in printing expenses for PCO employee W-2
forms;

(5)

$765 in storage costs; and

(6)

$225,000 as the value of Park's personal services
in negotiating releases of Olson and others on
jointly-guaranteed leasehold and franchise obligations of PCO.

R. 405-10 (1M 16, 17, 18, 19 and 21). Each of the cash advances
was alleged to be to or for the benefit of PCO.

R. 405-06.

The

advance of $4,374.73 was made before July 31, 1988, but all other
advances were made after that date.

16.

Park's counterclaim

does not allege that he paid any money on any jointly-guaranteed
obligations, except the $235,000 paid on the Bank's notes (which
was completely reimbursed by PCO).
19).

R. 404-09 (ff 15, 17, 18 and

Instead, the counterclaim alleges that each of Olson's

guaranties (except to the Bank) was released, or the underlying
obligations cancelled or terminated, without payment by Park.

R.

406-09 (fit 17 and 18) .
Each of the advances by Park to PCO, for which he seeks
partial reimbursement from Olson, and Park's actions in negotiating and obtaining releases, directly or indirectly benefitted
Park.

R. 240-318 (Aff. of Park), 397-414 (Park's Counterclaim).

Park's counterclaim makes no allegation that any of the services
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performed by Park were requested by Olson, or that Olson made any
statement or did any act that led Park to believe he would be
compensated by Olson for his services.

R. 397-414 • In fact,

Park alleged in the trial court that he was unable to obtain the
cooperation or participation of Olson in negotiating with
creditors.

R. 248, 405.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The bulk of the Appellants' arguments on appeal were not
presented to the trial court; therefore, the issues may not be
considered on appeal.

Even if considered on the merits,

Appellants' argument that Olson is not entitled to contribution
is without merit, since based upon the mistaken notion that
reimbursement of Park by PCO, the principal obligor, should be
disregarded.
Park's counterclaim was properly dismissed for failure to
state a claim, since Park can establish no set of facts that
would prove that Olson appreciated and knew of a benefit
allegedly conferred by Park, or that the benefit was conferred
under circumstances that would render it unjust for Olson to
retain the benefit without paying Park.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415, and general principles of
suretyship, Olson was entitled to an award of his attorneys' fees
incurred in defending the Bank's lawsuit and in pursuing indemnity from PCO.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
ARGUMENTS RAISED BY APPELLANTS FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED.
A basic tenet of appellate review is that, generally
speaking, issues and defenses not presented to the trial court
may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983).

Banaerter v.

A litigant may not complain

of error by the trial court if that court was not presented the
opportunity to err.

Consistent with this principle, numerous

defenses raised by Park and PCO for the first time in this appeal
should not be considered in determining the correctness of the
trial court's orders and judgment.
Although the trial court proceedings in this matter were
concluded without undue delay, there is no question but that the
parties were given a full and fair opportunity to present all
issues and defenses to the district court judge.

Numerous memo-

randa, objections, affidavits, and other pleadings were presented
to the trial court for consideration in resolving the various
motions.

Notwithstanding the opportunity to present whatever

issues and defenses they wished the trial court to consider, PCO
and Park failed to raise the following arguments (referenced by
the portion of Appellants' Brief in which the argument is raised)
now urged as grounds for reversal:
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POINT I.A.: That Park was not liable for contribution
because he paid more than his proportionate share of
PCO's debt to the Bank, the fact that Park was reimbursed by PCO being irrelevant.
POINT I.B.: That Olson did not pay more than his
proportionate share of the Bank's claims, since the
guarantors should share equally in discharging the
obligations and Olson did not pay more than one-third
of the total debt (the "total debt" being calculated
without regard to PCO's reimbursement of Park),
POINT II: That the amount of Park's liability was
incorrectly calculated, since Olson's proportionate
share should be based upon the total owed to the Bank
(which Park alleges was approximately $320,000), without regard to PCO's reimbursement of Park.
POINT IV: That no attorneys' fees should be awarded
plaintiff because there was no evidence that Olson
became a surety with the consent of PCO.
None of the foregoing arguments was urged as a defense or an
issue in the trial court by Park or PCO.

The only one of these

issues even adverted to in the district court was the notion that
co-guarantors of a corporate debt should share liability on their
guaranties in the same proportion as their stock ownership.

That

legal position was pled in Olson's complaint and was urged in
support of Olson's motion for summary judgment against Park and
Craig.

Neither defendant contested the argument below; contrari-

wise, Park's counterclaim urged that the court should award reimbursement of Park's claimed expenses on the same basis (Olson's
percentage ownership of PCO). Thus, not only did Park fail to
make it an issue for resolution by the court, he adopted the
legal position as his own in pleading the counterclaim.
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As the Court noted in Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987), the record on
appeal must demonstrate that an argument has been presented to
the trial court in such a fashion that a ruling has been obtained
thereon.

Nothing in the record demonstrates that these arguments

were presented to the trial court; therefore, neither Park nor
PCO may claim the trial court erred in rejecting them.
POINT II
PARK'S COUNTERCLAIM FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM
UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED.
On appeal, Park argues that his counterclaim sets forth
facts that establish a claim for relief on a quasi-contract or
unjust enrichment theory.

Park argues that if one accepts the

material allegations of the counterclaim as true, construes the
counterclaim in the light most favorable to Park, and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the counterclaimant, then Park
has pled a right to relief under a contract implied in law.
However, the counterclaim fails to afford a basis upon which
relief can be granted, since it fails to allege facts which, even
liberally interpreted, would support a cause of action for unjust
enrichment.
In Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the
court reviewed the law concerning quantum meruit claims.

The

court noted that quantum meruit claims may be either contracts
implied in law, such as quasi-contract or unjust enrichment
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claims, or contracts implied in fact (a contract established by
conduct of the parties).

In either case, however, the claim is

recognized by the courts in order to prevent a party's enrichment
at another's expense,

id. at 269.

Park admits that the counterclaim does not allege any contract implied in fact, but instead asserts that a quasi-contract
or unjust enrichment claim is pled.

As the Davies opinion

explained:
The elements of a quasi-contract, or a contract implied
in law, are: (1) the defendant received a benefit; (2)
an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the
benefit; (3) under circumstances that would make it
unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without
paying for it.
Id. at 269.

Even a charitable interpretation of Park's asser-

tions does not establish the final two elements of a quasicontract claim.
Park alleges that a benefit was conferred upon Olson, thus
satisfying the first element of the test.

Because Park alleges

in the counterclaim that he secured releases of Olson's guaranties by his personal efforts, and not as PCO's president or by
the use of PCO's assets, the allegation that a benefit was
conferred is presumed true at this stage.1

That Park was the

majority shareholder and in control of PCO, that his efforts

Mark's counterclaim also sought reimbursement for 16.67% of
certain cash advances by Park to PCO. R. 405-06. It appears
these claims have been abandoned on appeal. As none of the cash
advances was used to pay jointly guaranteed debts, no claim for
relief was stated.
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resulted in a discharge of his own indebtedness, and that PCO's
assets were sold in the transaction that secured the releases,
will not, at this stage, defeat Park's assertion that Olson
received a benefit; however, such facts must be considered in
determining whether the other two elements of the cause of action
can be proved.
Textbook examples of contract implied in law include money
paid by mistake, and where a claimant paints a house by mistake
with the owner standing by and watching the claimant's efforts*
In these textbook examples, the person against whom the claim is
lodged both appreciated and had knowledge of the benefit under
circumstances that would make it unjust to allow the benefit to
be retained without paying for it.

No allegation of the counter-

claim, either specifically or generally, supports a finding that
Olson appreciated and knew of the benefit of his releases from
guaranties under circumstances that would make it unjust for him
to retain the benefit.
Park alleges that Olson knew Park was attempting to negotiate compromises with creditors, a sale of PCO's assets, and a
release of their guaranty obligations, but that Olson refused to
participate or assist in Park's efforts.

Park also alleges that

Olson knew, from being furnished a draft of the proposed asset
sale to Marie Callender Ventures, Inc., that as a result of the
sale Olson would be released from his personal guaranties.

Park

claims that from those facts, one may infer that Olson had an
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appreciation or knowledge of a benefit being furnished by Park.
While it may be appropriate to infer that Olson had knowledge he
was being released from guaranties, it is an unjustified leap of
faith, and not a reasonable inference, to conclude that Olson
appreciated that the benefit was being conferred by Park, rather
than by PCO as the principal obligor.
Related to this issue is whether the counterclaim alleges
circumstances that would make it unjust to permit Olson to retain
the benefit of his releases without payment.

Park claims that

this element is satisfied by reference to two allegations:

(1)

that Olson received a benefit; and (2) that Park requested Olson
to assist, either financially or personally, in negotiations with
creditors.

It is, once again, a leap of faith, and not a reason-

able inference, to conclude from these allegations that it would
be unjust for Olson to retain the benefit without paying for it.
In Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564
P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1977), the court stated:
The mere fact that a third person benefits from a
contract between two others does not make such third
person liable in quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or
restitution. See 66 Am. Jur.2d 960. There must be
some misleading act, request for services, or the like,
to support such an action. Mere failure of performance
by one of the contracting parties does not give rise to
a right of restitution.
The court1s holding is consistent with the Restatement of
Restitution § 112 (1937):
A person who without mistake, coercion or request has
unconditionally conferred a benefit upon another is not
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entitled to restitution, except where the benefit was
conferred under circumstances making such action
necessary for the protection of the interests of the
other or of third persons.
In Park's counterclaim, there is no allegation of any misleading
act, request for services, or any other action by or duty of
Olson that would make it unjust for Olson to retain the benefit
of his releases without paying Park.

To the contrary, the alle-

gations of the counterclaim demonstrate that Park was, by his own
efforts, personally released from contingent liabilities apparently in excess of Olson's.

R. 402-03, 405-09.

Park's services

would have been furnished in any event, as Park was clearly
motivated by his own interests.2
This court has repeatedly held that services performed by a
party for his own advantage, and from which the defendant benefits incidentally, are not recoverable.

See Bauqh v. Parley, 184

P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1947); Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205, 209
(Utah 1976); Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557-58 (Utah
1984).

The court has not used the term "incidental" as a synonym

for inconsequential, but as descriptive of benefits resulting as
a byproduct of a person's actions.

2

Sparks v. Gustafson, 750 P.2d 338 (Alaska 1988), is
distinguishable on this point. In Sparks, the claimant managed
the business of another in which he had no ownership. The
appeals court upheld the trial court's determination that the
services performed were of a nature usually compensated, and not
offered gratuitously.
-13-

In Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d at 209, the Court posed the
issue as follows:

"Under these circumstances, did the defendant

have a duty to pay plaintiff that the law will impute to him a
promise to fulfill that obligation?"

Under no set of facts that

may be proved by Park, or reasonably inferred from the counterclaim, did Olson have a "duty" to pay Park, such that the law
will imply a promise and a remedy.

Dismissal of the counterclaim

was therefore appropriate.
POINT III
THE COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAINST
PCO WAS APPROPRIATE.
The trial court awarded to Olson $1,310.50 incurred in connection with the Bank's lawsuit.

The court further awarded Olson

the sum of $2,500 against PCO for attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in this lawsuit.

PCO disputes the awards of attorneys'

fees, claiming that Olson was only entitled to reimbursement of
the payment made on PCO's debt to the Bank, since he failed to
show he was a surety at the request of or with the consent of
PCO, and further that attorneys' fees in this action were not
awardable because there is no statute or contract so providing.
PCO is in error.
First, as noted above, the argument regarding the award of
attorneys' fees incurred in the First Security Bank lawsuit was
not raised below and has therefore been waived.

Further, under

the circumstances of this case, it can hardly be argued that PCO
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did not know and agree to Olson's becoming a surety.

Thus, the

argument is not well taken on the merits.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415 allows Olson to recover attorneys' fees incurred in this action as against PCO, since he is
entitled to enforce the instruments he has paid.

In Kennedy v.

Bank of Ephraim, 594 P.2d 881, 884 (Utah 1979), the court specifically held that a person signing a letter of guaranty was an
accommodation party as that term is used in § 70A-3-415.

In

Murray v. Payne, 437 So.2d 47 (Miss. 1983), the court interpreted
the statute similarly, holding that because guarantors are sureties they are also accommodation parties under U.C.C. § 3-415.
Under § 70A-3-415(5), an accommodation party that pays the
instrument has a right a recourse on the instrument against the
accommodated party (in this case, PCO). Since the Bank's notes
provided for an award of attorneys' fees, attorneys' fees should
likewise be awarded to Olson.

Further, as Official Comment 5 to

U.C.C. § 3-415 notes, an accommodation party is subrogated to the
rights of the holder under general principles of suretyship.

The

court's award of attorneys' fees was therefore correct.
POINT IV
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PARK ON THE
CONTRIBUTION CLAIM WAS PROPER.
As noted in Point I, supra. Park's arguments regarding the
correctness of the trial court's award of contribution against
Park are raised for the first time in this appeal and, therefore,
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should not be considered.

In addition, the arguments are without

merit.
Park argues that the court's summary judgment was improper
because Park's payment of $235,000 was in excess of his proportionate share of the obligation (Appellants' Point I.A.), and
that Olson never paid in excess of his proportionate share
(Appellants' Point II.). These arguments are based upon the
mistaken notion that PCO's reimbursement of the $235,000 paid by
Park should be disregarded.

There is no basis in the law for

ignoring the fact that PCO honored its indemnity obligation to
its controlling shareholder.3

At the time Olson brought his

Complaint, Park had been fully reimbursed by PCO, PCO had no
further obligation to the Bank, and Olson was the only guarantor
who had paid any sums not yet reimbursed.
The rule of law suggested by Park's argument is nonsensical
and unfair.

It would permit a controlling shareholder and co-

guarantor to escape liability for contribution by causing the
corporation to reimburse any advances made by the controlling
shareholder on the guaranty.

Thus, by unfair manipulation of the

3

The authorities apparently relied upon by Park on this
point (Restatement of Restitution § 85 (1937) and Restatement of
Security § 154(4) (1941)) are specifically limited to reimbursement by the principal obligor after a final settlement between
cosureties. Restatement of Security § 154, comment (e) (1941),
notes, "The amount of the proportionate shares for which
cosureties are liable among themselves is affected by the extent
to which the principal himself performs. This is true whether
the principal's partial performance is before or after the
surety's performance."
-16-

corporation's finances, the controlling shareholder would, under
Park's theory, escape any liability on his guaranty, notwithstanding the fact that the creditor has been paid in full and one
or more other co-guarantors have not been reimbursed.

This

argument simply does not make any sense, and no authority is
cited for the proposition.
Park also argues, for the first time on appeal, that Park,
Craig and Olson should share liability equally, notwithstanding
their disparate ownership of stock of PCO.

Although there is a

split of authority on this issue (and apparently no Utah precedent), a division of liability based upon proportionate ownership
in an enterprise is the better rule of law.
Typically, the cases holding that liability for contribution
should be determined without regard to unequal ownership in an
enterprise simply apply a presumption that liability is to be
shared equally.

As Park recognizes, however, there is an

exception to the general rule of equal contribution if the coguarantors have received unequal benefits.

Should the court

choose to address it, the issue is therefore whether the presumption should be that co-guarantors of a corporate debt have
impliedly agreed to share liability in proportion to their stock
ownership, or equally.

The issue is not whether an immutable

rule should be established, but whether in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, a common liability of shareholders/
sureties should be shared in proportion to stock ownership.
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The search is for a legal presumption that will apply in
most instances.

The search should, therefore, begin with an

examination of the cause of action asserted, that being a claim
for contribution.

Generally speaking, a right to contribution is

a contract, implied between co-guarantors, that liability on a
common debt will be shared.

As Park recognizes, if co-

guarantors receive unequal benefits from the common obligation,
then contribution will be ordered based upon the proportionate
benefits.

Where, as in this case, the co-guarantors' interests

in the principal obligor are not equal, the court should presume,
in the absence of contrary evidence, that the benefit was similarly unequal.
1983).

See Bossard v. Sullivan, 670 P.2d 1389 (Mont.

Considering only unequal ownership of a corporate obligor

by co-guarantors, the promise that should be implied is a sharing
of liability in proportion to stock ownership, because the benefits from the obligation are proportionate to stock ownership.
In Brown v. Goldsmith, 437 P.2d 247, 248 (Okla. 1968), the
court held that contribution should be based upon proportionate
ownership of stock, and reasoned:
In the present case, the purpose of the loan guaranty
agreement was to enable the corporation to conduct and
operate its business at a profit for the benefit of the
stockholders. The money from the indebtedness was
received and used by the corporation. The indebtedness
was incurred for the use and benefit of the corporation, who was the primary obligor. If this indebtedness had resulted in a profit for the corporation, the
defendant would have received this benefit in proportion to the extent of his stock ownership in the
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company. Assuming also, if the corporation could have
repaid the indebtedness, the value of defendant's stock
would have been reduced proportionately. We see no
reason to apply a different rule for the losses
incurred by the co-obligors under their agreement. It
is only equitable that the burden of the obligation be
borne by the defendant in proportion to the amount of
his ownership of stock in the corporation.
See also Restatement of Restitution § 85, comment (f) (1937).
While circumstances can be imagined that would result in equal
benefits to co-guarantors with unequal stock ownership, such
circumstances would be relatively unusual.

The better presump-

tion is, therefore, that co-guarantors of a corporate debt have
impliedly agreed to share the debt in the proportions of their
stock ownership at the time the guaranties are executed, since
the guarantors would expect to benefit in the same proportions.
In the event the court considers this issue, it should adopt this
general rule.

Thus, on the basis of the record establishing the

respective stock ownerships, the trial court's judgment was
proper.
CONCLUSION
The orders and judgment of the trial court should be
affirmed, and the matter remanded for a determination of
attorneys1 fees to be awarded Olson against PCO in connection
with this appeal.
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